This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of maximizing the total joint reward, but also the allocation of these rewards among the agents. Analyzing these situations a new class of transferable utility games is introduced, called multipurpose resource games. These games are based on the bankruptcy model, as introduced by O'Neill (1982) . It is shown that every multipurpose resource game is compromise stable. Moreover, an explicit expression for the nucleolus of these games is provided.
Introduction
The model of bankruptcy situations was first analyzed from a game theoretic perspective by O'Neill (1982) . In a bankruptcy situation a certain amount of money, the estate, has to be divided among a group of claimants. Each claimant has a justified claim on the estate such that the sum of these claims exceeds the available estate. The example originally given by O'Neill is of the division of an estate amongst several heirs when the estate cannot meet all the deceased's commitments. Another example is of a firm going bankrupt, whose remaining assets do not cover the total demand of all creditors.
Many rules have been proposed to fairly allocate the estate in bankruptcy situations. Some of these rules are based on the associated cooperative bankruptcy game where the worth of a coalition is equal to what is left of the estate if all other claimants would receive their demands. Aumann and Maschler (1985) proposed and characterized a rule that coincides with the nucleolus of this corresponding bankruptcy game. For an overview on bankruptcy rules we refer to Thomson (2003) .
The bankruptcy model is a general framework for various kinds of allocation problems and is applied to many cases such as cost-sharing problems (Moulin, 1991) , taxation problems (Young, 1988) , and apportionment of indivisible good(s) problems (Young, 1995) . In the past, several extensions are proposed for the basic bankruptcy model. One of them is Calleja et al. (2005) where multi-issue allocation problems are analyzed. A second is Kaminski (2000) , where claims are multidimensional rather than one-dimensional.
In this paper we present another extension for the traditional bankruptcy problem. In a multipurpose resource allocation (MPRA) situation there is a limited supplied resource (e.g. water). Agents are characterized by a justified claim on the resource and a reward function which describes the (monetary) reward for assigned resources. A specific resource assignment leads to some total joint reward obtained by the agents. The aim is to find a fair allocation of the maximum joint reward. In particular, rewards may be redistributed among the agents such that agents are compensated who cede their resources to others.
The general framework we propose in this paper is applicable to the field of water resource management. Water resource management often involves a multitude of different agents with different interests who put their claim on a common-pool resource. The Tennessee Valley Authority case (Ransmeier, 1942 ) is one of the earliest cases that offered game theorists an opportunity to examine a practical problem of cost allocation in a water resources development project. Straffin and Heaney (1981) outlined some basic cooperative game theoretic principles embedded in the analysis of this case and translated the main cost allocation methods into 'game theory language'. In Carraro et al. (2005) , Parrachino et al. (2006) , and Zara et al. (2006) an elaborated review is provided of game theoretic water conflict resolution studies. For a recent overview of the literature about game theory and water resources we refer to Madani (2010) .
A game theoretic analysis of MPRA-situations falls within the framework of operations research games. These games are concerned with the combinatorial optimization problem of finding a joint optimal structure like a network or processing order. After the optimal structure is determined, cooperative game theory is applied subsequently to analyze the allocation of rewards. A survey of operations research games is provided by Borm et al. (2001) .
Also for MPRA-situations we first analyze a joint optimization problem, the maximization of total joint reward via an optimal assignment of resources. Secondly, the maximum total joint reward is allocated to the agents. This is done by analyzing the associated cooperative multipurpose resource (MR) game. For this game the value of a particular coalition reflects the maximum total joint reward that can be derived from the amount of resources not claimed by agents outside the coalition. It is shown that MR-games extend bankruptcy games and that the property of compromise stability can be extended to MR-games, although the property of convexity is not maintained in general. Moreover, an explicit expression for the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) for MR-games is provided. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the formal model of multipurpose resource allocation situations is described and the optimal assignments of resources are characterized. In section 3, we introduce and analyze corresponding multipurpose resource games. Section 4 is devoted to compromise stability and the computation of the nucleolus. Technical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Multipurpose Resource Allocation Situations
This section formally introduces multipurpose resource allocation situations. After introducing the model, optimal assignments of resources, in which the total joint reward is maximized, are characterized .
A bankruptcy situation is a triple (N, E, d) , where N represents a finite set of claimants, E ≥ 0 is the estate (e.g money) which has to be divided among the claimants, and d ∈ R N ++ is a vector of claims, where for i ∈ N , d i represents agent i's claim on the estate. To justify the term 'bankruptcy' it is assumed that j∈N d j ≥ E.
An MPRA-situation extends a bankruptcy situation (N, E, d), with an estate E of some resource (e.g. water) and a claim vector d on this resource, by adding a reward vector α ∈ R N ++ in the following way. For every agent i ∈ N there exists a reward function r i : R + → R + describing the monetary gain of resources for agent i. For every z ∈ R + , r i (z) denotes the monetary reward for agent i if he is assigned z units of resource. In this paper the focus is on linear reward functions. Hence, for every i ∈ N there exists an α i ∈ R ++ such that r i (z) = α i z. An MPRA-situation will be summarized by (N, E, d, α) . The class of all MPRA-situations with set of agents N is denoted by M P RA N . An outcome for an MPRA-situation consists of two elements: an assignment of resources and an allocation of the associated monetary reward. Throughout this paper 'assignment' refers to the distribution of resources (e.g. water) and 'allocation' to the distribution of rewards (e.g. money). Formally, a solution f : (1) tells us that the sum of assigned resources is equal to the estate. Constraint (2) ensures that the assigned resources do not exceed the demand and are non-negative for all agents in N . Let F (N, E, d, α) be the set of feasible assignments x determined by conditions (1) and (2), i.e.
Constraint (3) ensures that the total reallocated sum of rewards is equal to the total joint reward obtained from the underlying assignment x. One specific type of solutions are the direct solutions.
, where r(x) = (α i x i ) i∈N is the direct reward vector with respect to x.
Example 2.1. Consider an MPRA-situation (N, E, d, α) ∈ M P RA N with N = {1, 2, 3} and estate E = 3. Assume that agent 1 claim 2 units of resource, the others both claim 1. Therefore, the demand vector equals d = (2, 1, 1). Note that the sum of these demands exceeds the available estate such that not all agents can obtain their full demand. With reward vector α = (1, 1, 2) e.g. the reward function of agent 1 is given by r 1 (z) = z for z such that 0 ≤ z ≤ d 1 . Consider the feasible assignment x = (2, 1, 0) with total joint reward 3. Note that r(x) = (2, 1, 0) while e.g. also y(x) = (1, 1, 1) satisfies conditions (3) and (4). ♦
The set of feasible assignments is large and there are many possible (re)allocations of the corresponding rewards. Throughout this article, assignments of resources are considered which maximize the total joint reward. The remainder of this section is dedicated to finding these optimal assignments.
The set X(N, E, d, α) of optimal assignments is given by
Before characterizing the set X(N, E, d, α) of optimal assignments we introduce some additional notations. Let m = |{α i |i ∈ N }| be the number of different reward parameters. Recursively, a partition of N is introduced by defining sets N 1 , N 2 , . . . N m by
for all l ∈ {2, . . . , m}. For l ∈ {1, . . . , m} let β l be the uniquely defined reward parameter for every agent in N l . Clearly,
If E = j∈N d j , then we assume k = m. With pivot index k define three disjoint sets P 1 , P 2 and P 3 of agents in the following way
Note that P 1 and P 3 may be empty, but P 2 is always non-empty.
Example 2.2.
Reconsider the MPRA-situation of Example 2.1. Clearly, N 1 = {3} with β 1 = α 3 = 2 and N 2 = {1, 2} with β 2 = α 1 = α 2 = 1. Observe that
Hence, the pivot index is k = 2. Consequently, P 1 = N 1 = {3}, P 2 = N 2 = {1, 2}, and P 3 = ∅. ♦ Optimal assignments, which maximize the total joint reward, are characterized in the following theorem.
Proof. Let x ∈ X(N, E, d, α). First suppose there exists an agent i ∈ P 1 such that
We may conclude that there is at least one agent j ∈ P 2 ∪ P 3 for which x j > 0. Since α j < α i , the total joint reward would strictly increase if agent j transfers min{d i − x i , x j } to agent i. This establishes a contradiction.
Secondly, suppose there exists an agent i ∈ P 3 such that x i > 0. This implies that
Consequently, there is at least one agent j ∈ P 1 ∪ P 2 whose demand is not fully satisfied, i.e. x j < d j . Since α j > α i , the total joint reward would increase if agent i transfers min{d j − x j , x i } to agent j. This establishes a contradiction and proves the only if part. The fact that all assignments x ∈ F (N, E, d, α) such that x i = d i for all i ∈ P 1 and x i = 0 for all i ∈ P 3 lead to the same total joint reward finishes the proof.
Example 2.3. The set of optimal assignments of the MPRA-situation of Example 2.1 can be written as follows:
Conv{(2, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1)}.
♦
In general there is not a unique optimal assignment. The MPRA-situations for which there is exactly one optimal assignment are characterized in the following corollary.
Multipurpose Resource Games
In this section we introduce the class of multipurpose resource (MR) games. A transferable utility (TU) game is an ordered pair (N, v) where N is the finite set of agents, and v the characteristic function on 2 N , the set of all subsets of N . The function v assigns to every coalition S ∈ 2 N a real number v(S) with v(∅) = 0. Here, v(S) is called the worth or value of the coalition S. The set of all TU-games with set of agents N is denoted by T U N . Where no confusion arises, we write v rather then (N, v) .
Consider a bankruptcy situation (N, E, d). For the associated bankruptcy (BR) game v E,d the value of a coalition S is determined by the amount of E that is not claimed by agent in N \ S. Hence,
N . Now consider an MPRA-situation M = (N, E, d, α) . We assume that a coalition S can only use the amount of resources D(S) not demanded by the agents in N \S.
S describe the associated multipurpose resource allocation situation for S, where
Note that D(N ) = E. The class of MR-games extends the class of BR-games, i.e. every BRgame can be written as an MR-game in which α i = α j for all i, j ∈ N . In the MR-game v M , associated to an MPRA-situation M = (N, E, d, α), the worth of coalition S equals
Let S l = S ∩N l for all l ∈ {1, . . . , m}. We extend the definition of the pivot index, as provided in (5) for the grand coalition, to every possible coalition S as follows. The pivot index k(S) is such that
If D(S) = 0, then we assume that k(S) = 1 and if
be an optimal assignment of resources to agents in S. Theorem 2.1 tells us that
M (S) equals the total direct reward of agents in S associated to x S . This allows us to construct an explicit formula for v M (S).
Theorem 3.1. Let M = (N, E, d, α) ∈ M P RA N and let v M be the associated MR-game. Then
for all S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}. We illustrate the underlying computations for coalition S = {1, 2}. Note that N 1 = {3}, S 1 = ∅ and N 2 = S 2 = {1, 2}. The amount of available resources equals
This yields,
and consequently, k(S) = 2. Therefore,
♦ From Example 3.1 we immediately see that MR-games are not convex in general since the condition
for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i} is violated for S = {3}, T = {1, 3} and i = 2.
Lemma 3.2 describes a relation between pivot indices of two coalitions.
Lemma 3.3 provides a monotonicity result for optimal assignments.
for all l ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
The proofs of Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 can be found in the Appendix.
A game v ∈ T U N is called balanced if the core C(v) of the game is non-empty. The core is defined by
N is called totally balanced if every subgame is balanced, i.e. if every subgame has a non-empty core. 
) i∈T be the direct allocation. To prove that v M is totally balanced, it is sufficient to prove that y(
The second and third equality follows from Theorem 2.1. From Lemma 3.2 we see that k(S) ≤ k(T ). If k(S) < k(T ), then the inequality is readily verified. If k(S) = k(T ), then we use Lemma 3.3 to see that this inequality holds. The last equality follows from Theorem 3.1.
Compromise Stability and the Nucleolus
In this section we prove that MR-games are compromise stable and we derive an explicit expression for the nucleolus of MR-games. Let v ∈ T U N . The core cover CC(v), as introduced by Tijs and Lipperts (1982) , is given by
where the utopia demand M i (v) of agent i ∈ N is defined by
and the minimum right m i (v) of agent i ∈ N equals
Note that m i (v) ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . Moreover, for any TU-game v it holds that C(v) ⊂ CC(v). It is readily verified that M (v M ) = (8, 3, 7, 2) and m(v M ) = (3, 0, 2, 0) while
, 2, 2), (8, 0, 7, 0), (8, 0, 5, 2), (5, 3, 7, 2), (3, 3, 7, 2), (6, 0, 7, 2)}.
Moreover, since each of the seven extreme points of the core cover belong to the core, we may conclude that
and CC(v) = ∅. Moreover, it was proved that each BR-game is both convex and compromise stable while reversely, each convex and compromise stable game is strategically equivalent to a BR-game. In what follows N −i is a shorthand notation for N \ {i}.
Lemma 4.1. Let M = (N, E, d, α) ∈ M P RA N , let v M be the corresponding MR-game, and let i ∈ N .
If
and
2b/2c: Let i ∈ P 2 ∪ P 3 . By Theorem 3.1 it holds that
This finishes 2b/2c. Quant et al. (2005) prove that a game v ∈ T U N is compromise stable if and only if
to establish that v is compromise stable.
Using this observation the appendix shows that every MR-game is compromise stable.
Next we derive an explicit expression for the nucleolus of an MR-game. Recall (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985) ) that the nucleolus n(v E,d ) of bankruptcy game v E,d ∈ T U N can be computed as follows:
where
with λ such that j∈N min{λ,
Although v M is not necessarily convex and therefore not strategically equivalent to a BRgame, the nucleolus of v M corresponds to the AM-rule of a related BR-problem.
Hence,
This implies D(S) = 0 and k(S) = 1. Next assume that D(T ) > 0. First note that
where the first and last inequality follow from (6). This implies that k(S) − 1 < k(T ) and consequently k(S) ≤ k(T ).
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let l ∈ {1, . . . , m}. We will prove that
Assume D(S) > 0. As before, this implies that
Since S ⊂ T , it follows from Lemma 3.2 that k(S) ≤ k(T ). Therefore, the only case that remains to be considered is l = k(S) = k(T ). In that case
where the first and fifth equality hold by Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}. We will prove that 
Set k = k(N ). First let {N l \ S l |l ∈ {k, . . . , m}} = ∅. This tells us that
which implies that k(S) = k. Hence, The first equality follow from Theorem 3.1, Lemma 4.1(2a,2b). The third equality holds by using Lemma 3.2 such that k(N −i * ) ≥ k(S) for i * ∈ N \ S. The first and second inequality are due to the fact that β k(N −i * ) < β l for all l ∈ {k(S), . . . , k(N −i * ) − 1}, β k(N −i * ) > β l for all l ∈ {k(N −i * ) + 1, . . . , k − 1}, and β k(N −i * ) ≥ β k(N−j ) for all j ∈ m l=k (N l \ S l )
